The Soviet Union has good prospects of becoming the dominant supplier of gold in the world, for its own mining reserves are large and the deposits in the Western world are nearing exhaustion. This need not however -as is shown in the following article -give rise to excessive fears in the West as the interests of the Soviet Union are pointing in the same direction as those of the West.
N
o other metal has held such fascination for man as gold which was invested with a special mystique in prehistoric times already. This is doubly true of the Soviet gold although according to communist doctrine it should no longer play any role at all.
That the Soviet gold is again and again giving rise to speculation in the West is due to the following facts in particular: [] Since 1933 the Soviet Union has not published any information on the trend of gold production. The country is however undoubtedly the second largest gold producer after South Africa.
[] Figures on the domestic consumption of gold for industrial purposes in the USSR are lacking. Soviet citizens are not allowed to own gold although since 1976 the Chervonets, a 10-rouble gold coin, has been on sale through banks in the West (7.74 grammes-~ 0.25 troy ounces) to benefit from value added tax exemption as for instance in the Federal Republic of Germany.
[] Exports of gold are not shown in the foreign trade accounts of the Soviet Union, so that the * University of Hamburg. ] Such estimates can be made easily however because there are only two principal markets -London and ZLirich -of which the latter is definitely preferred by the Soviet foreign trade authorities, so that the bulk of the Soviet exports is channeled to the gold market through a few big banks (Swiss Bank Corporation, Credit Suisse [Swiss Credit Sank], Union Bank of Switzerland). Cf. Wirtschaftswoche No. 12, March 11, 1977, p. 73 . 2 For lack of official Soviet data on the balance of payments and gold situation volume and value figures for the output, sales, domestic consumption and reserves of Soviet gold are shown (in several dimensions as customary in gold statistics) in selfconsistent tables. Where the consulted sources give different estimates, later estimates are given preference over earlier ones; this seems justified as the institutes themselves often revise their figures. Where figures were not available, the author computed them as a rule from differences between available estimates. For various years annual figures had to be imputed because the available estimates covered several years together. Where this has been done, the sum of the annual figures equals the estimate for the several years' period while each of the annual figures is by itself indicative of a plausible trend. [] Another popular subject is the Spanish gold treasure of about 500 ts (i.e. 16.08 mn troy ounces) which was taken to Russia in 1936. It was claimed back by the Franco regime ever after, while the Soviet Union has laid claim to it as payment for arms deliveries. The latest version of the Soviet argument is that the gold store, since it could not be .disposed of lawfully, was handed over as collateral security and that the Soviet Union has in the meantime become its lawful owner. De facto the Spanish gold has certainly to be included in the Soviet gold reserves.
Quantitative Changes
An indication of the magnitude of the Soviet gold output, gold sales and gold reserves and their significance on a world scale will do most to answer the questions which have been raised and to de-mythologize the Soviet gold 2.
The difficulties encountered in compiling such data suggest that it would be wrong to take too much notice of certain individual figures in Tables 1 and 2; but it is equally clear that the tables in their entirety and in regard to the various several years' periods are an important and approximately accurate basis of information. It is true that the figures given by the consulted sources s for Soviet foreign currency earnings in various calendar years differ in part substantially, but a comparison of such figures over several years shows that the over-and under-estimates of gold sales cancel out. -The Western estimates of the Soviet gold reserves range for the end of 1976 from 2,000 to 3,000 ts: Compilation and extrapolation of various estimates actually leads to a total of 2,330 ts which includes the 500 ts of "Spanish" gold.
The particular features of the "world gold market" will be traced first in the attempt to judge what real grounds there exist for Western fears. The world gold market is in fact more akin to the international stock markets than to the commodity markets, for gold is a commodity held for investment and usufruct (without planned amortization) rather than as an article of consumption which loses its identity through processing and manufacture, as happens normally with raw materials.
Another feature which the gold market and the stock markets have in common is that only a fraction of the total stock is being turned over in any given period (a daily session, a month or a year) and that the market price for this fraction determines the value of the whole stock. In this respect the gold market may be compared with the market in the shares of a company with one big shareholder of which comparatively little stock is held and bought and sold by others. In 1976 for instance a turnover of no more than 1,257 ts determined the valuation of a total stock of about 80,000 ts. Inverse movements of supply and demand -greater demand because of rising prices, larger offerings because of falli,ng prices -and high price flexibility due to low supply and demand elasticities intermingle, partly for speculative reasons, in almost unaccountable market developments.
These indications of extreme vulnerability of the gold market may be disquieting. But how much scope is there in fact for the Soviets to sway the world gold market?
Limitations as a Collateral Security
If the collateral security function of the Soviet golcl is to be regarded as a sign of the creditworthiness of the USSR, the assessment can clearly not be based on the actual size of the gold reserves (i.e. on a simple static calculation of the gold cover) since they would have to be sold well below their estimated value of about US $ 10 bn if a sudden liquidation were contemplated, but on the ability and willingness of the Soviet Union to go on producing increasing quantitles of gold and to dispose of these continually in the West in exchange for hard currencies in such a way as not to upset the market 4. It may be assumed that the USSR is selling as much gold as the gold market can absorb without detriment; this invisible borderline also marks the limit to which the Soviet Union can go to offset balance of trade deficits with the West by sales of gold. With the trend of world trade and world trade balances as at present gold sales can compensate only for a very small fraction of the shortfall: In 1975 the Soviet trade with the West showed a deficit of about US $ 5 bn while the foreign currency earnings from sales of gold amounted to no more than US$ 780 mn -15% of the trade deficit -even at the record average gold price of US $161.09 per fine ou~nce. In 1976 the foreign currency proceeds from gold sales rose to US $ 1,220 mn, but the total indebtedness of the Soviet Union continued to grow rapidly.
These facts imply that the Soviet foreign trade authorities are in a position to refrain temporarily from offering gold in the market, that there is therefore no need whatsoever for distress sales of gold, for instance because loans are maturing, and that the Soviet Union is also exploring new channels and methods of selling gold. Recently it was learnt for instance that 50 ts of gold had been sold in 1975 for US$ 250 mn directly to Arab oil states like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Parallel Interests
The decline of the Western share of the gold production and market shows that the current trend is favouring the Soviet Union. In the long run it will be able to sell progressively larger quantities in the world market at favourable prices, for the requirements of industry and demand for jewellery are increasing in the West. The attitude of the Soviet foreign trade authorities to date .~uggests moreover that the Soviets have been paying closer attention to the mode of operation of the gold market than perhaps to any other market and want to use it for their own purposes. Intensive gold sales as occurred in [1963] [1964] [1965] would have ruinous consequences in such a narrow market. Western observers who are watching the Soviet gold production and hoarding with concern should bear in mind that in the gold marketthe economic interests of the USSR and of the Western world are pointing in the same direction. This also is a feature of the gold market which distinguishes it from most commodity markets. Rising prices mean higher earnings for the sellers; but the additional outlays of the gold buyers are overcompensated by the gain in value of the gold in the hands of gold owners. With gold stocks of about US $ 300 bn (1976) in the West and about US$ 10 bn in the Soviet Union a rise of the gold price by about 10% means -assuming the turnover fig-
